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Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of
Contract
GARETH DAVIES*
Abstract: Free movement law follows the contours of freedom of contract very closely. It
prevents public or private parties from interfering with the contractual freedom of
others. It does not, however, appear to be understood by the Court of Justice to apply to
contractual preferences as such. Thus, the gradual extension of its horizontal effect,
culminating in Viking Line, does not represent a gradual encroachment on freedom of
contract but a gradual extension of its power to prevent this freedom being restricted.
This contractual orientation has liberalizing consequences that are probably
economically inefficient, since they ignore the existing preferences of consumers, who do
not always want liberalization. Nor can it be seen as a moral liberalism rooted in
principled attachment to liberty: Freedom of contract appears to be instrumentally
viewed by the Court, as a tool of integration. Rather, this article suggests that the
contractual orientation of free movement reveals it to be an exercise in social
engineering, seeking to nudge Europeans into changing their domestic preferences for
more European ones.
Résumé: Le droit de la libre circulation suit les contours de la liberté contractuelle de
très près. Il empêche les parties publiques ou privées d’interférer avec la liberté
contractuelle des autres. Il n’apparaît cependant pas être compris par la Cour de Justice
comme s’applicant aux préférences contractuelles en tant que telles. Ainsi, l’extension
progressive de son effet horizontal, aboutissant à Viking Line, ne représente pas un
empiétement progressif sur la liberté contractuelle, mais plutôt une extension
progressive de son pouvoir; afin d’empêcher cette liberté d’être restreinte. Cette
orientation contractuelle a des conséquences concourant à la libéralisation qui sont
probablement économiquement inefficaces, car elles ignorent les préférences existantes
des consommateurs, qui ne souhaitent pas toujours la libéralisation. L’orientation
contractuelle du droit de la libre circulation ne peut non plus être considérée comme un
libéralisme moral enraciné dans l’attachement au principe de liberté. La liberté de
contrat semble être considérée instrumentalement par la Cour, qui la voit comme un
outil d’intégration. Cette analyse suggère plutôt que l’orientation contractuelle de la
libre circulation révèle qu’il s’agit d’un exercice d’ingénierie sociale, cherchant à
pousser les Européens à modifier leurs préférences nationales pour des choix plus
Européens.
* Professor of European law, Department of Transnational Legal Studies, VU University Amsterdam.
This article was first presented at a conference on EU and private law at the University of Oxford
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This article explores the relationship between the free movement articles of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and freedom of contract.
Recent cases apparently extending the horizontal effect of free movement raise the
possibility that this law has the potential to intervene intensively in private
agreements and invite the question of whether freedom of contract is to be sacrificed
on the altar of European integration, and the potentially domestic preferences of
private parties are to be rendered partially illegitimate.1 The finding of the article is
however that horizontal effect, as outlined by the Court so far, is a limited doctrine
wherein little basis is to be found for impinging on freedom of contract. Private
contractual preferences do not, in general, appear to be seen as restrictions on free
movement. This is consistent with the vertical effect of free movement law, which
functions primarily as a guarantee of freedom of contract. Free movement law,
whether vertically or horizontally applied, seems rather to focus on third-party
interference with the contracts of others. The conclusion considers what this tells us
about the internal market and suggests that it is shown to be a project primarily
oriented towards transforming mentalities – an exercise in neither classical
liberalism nor orthodox economics but in social engineering.
This article is structured as follows: the following section considers the role
of free movement law in the internal market and why its relationship with freedom
of contract may be of any importance. The next two sections consider the
application of free movement law to public and private measures, respectively
(vertical and horizontal effects), and describe the apparently close relationship
between free movement and freedom of contract.
2. The Wider Influence of Primary Free Movement Law
Freedom of contract is used in this article in a formal sense to describe a form of
party autonomy: the freedom of private persons to choose their contracting
partners and the subject of their contracts.2 That autonomy is impacted upon by all
forms of regulation that constrain who may buy or sell certain goods or services,
what goods or services may be sold, and on what terms. The most obvious and
1 ECJ 11 Dec. 2007, Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish
Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779. See J.
KRZEMINSKA-VAMVAKA, ‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms – Much Ado
about Nothing? German, Polish and EU Theories Compared after Viking Line’, Jean Monnet
Working Paper 11/09, 2009; A. DASHWOOD, ‘Viking and Laval: Issues of Horizontal Direct
Effect’, in C. Barnard (ed.), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 10, 2007–2008,
Hart, Oxford 2008, p. 525.
2 S. GRUNDMANN, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract
Law’, 39. CMLRev (Common Market Law Review) 2002, p. 269. Cf. A. COLOMBI CIACCHI,
‘Party Autonomy as a Fundamental Right in the European Union’, 6. European Review of
Contract Law 2010, p. 303.
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substantial impact of the internal market on party autonomy therefore results from
the mass of secondary legislation regulating standards, qualifications, and consumer
rights.3 The role of primary Treaty law in general, and in the story of the internal
market and private laws, is residual and decreasing. One may therefore ask why it
is worth devoting a paper to primary law and freedom of contract. Does the subject
matter? Is it possible to conclude anything from such a partial view?
Primary Treaty law and secondary legislation are not however separate
worlds of law but enjoy a complicated interrelationship, in which the former
influences the latter in several ways. Most relevant here is that application of the
Treaty often creates the conditions for later legislation.4 Application of free
movement rights to a new field of national law destabilizes policy in this area and
helps to create the political impetus for harmonization.5 The free movement of
patients, the equivalence of qualifications, the standardization of consumer goods,
and the services directive are all examples of this.6 Where primary law goes,
legislation often follows, reason enough to want to understand the limits of the
Treaty.
Moreover, as these same examples show, the substance of the legislation that
results often reflects the concepts and logic of the initial judgments in that field.
Why this may be is open to discussion: The conventional story that the Court’s
insights are adopted by the Commission and translated into legislative proposals has
been challenged by the view that it may be the Commission that first puts these
concepts into circulation within the institutions and the Court that then applies
them when the circumstances invite, or indeed there may be some more complex
relationship.7 However, whether the Court’s judgments on the Treaty are to be seen
3 See, e.g., H. EIDENMÜLLER et al., ‘Towards a Revision of the Consumer Aquis’, 48. CMLRev
2011, p. 1077.
4 W. KERBER & R. VAN DEN BERGH, ‘Mutual Recognition Revisited: Misunderstandings,
Inconsistencies, and a Suggested Reinterpretation’, 61. Kyklos 2008, p. 447; K.J. ALTER & S.
MEUNIER-AITSAHALIA, ‘Judicial Politics in the European Community. European Integration
and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’, 26. Comparative Political Studies 1994, p. 535; G.
DAVIES, ‘Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonization? Lessons and Tolerance of
Diversity from the EU’, in L. Bartels & F. Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the World
Trade Organization, p. 265.
5 C.F. SABEL & W.S. SIMON, ‘Destabilization Rights. How Public Law Litigation Succeeds’, 117.
Harvard Law Review 2004, p. 1015.
6 ALTER & MEUNIER-AITSAHALIA, n. 4 above; S.L. GREER & S. RAUSCHER, ‘Destabilization
Rights and Restabilization Politics: Policy and Political Reactions to European Union Healthcare
Services Law’, 18. Journal of European Public Policy 2011, p. 220; G. DAVIES, ‘Trust and Mutual
Recognition in the Services Directive’, in O. Odudu & I. Lianos (eds), Regulating Trade in Services
in the EU and WTO. Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration, CUP, Cambridge 2012, p. 230.
7 ALTER & MEUNIER-AITSAHALIA, n. 4 above; K. NICOLAIDIS & M. EGAN, ‘Transnational
Market Governance and Regional Policy Externality: Why Recognize Foreign Standards?’, 8.
Journal of European Public Policy 2001, p. 454; T. NOVAK, How Judgments Become Law and
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as the source of ideas, or the stamp of judicial approval for them, they often mark
the point at which these ideas become official currency and take a central role both
in the formulation of law and in the terms of policy debate.8
This influence extends after legislation has been adopted. It must then be
interpreted, and courts will do this in the light of the basic principles of the internal
market, as expressed by the Court in its judgments on the Treaty. These provide the
conceptual framework within which secondary law must fit. This process is aided by
the fact that secondary legislation usually draws heavily on language and concepts
used by the Court in its case law: The judgments become the building blocks of the
written law.
Finally, despite the growth of secondary legislation, there is still enough
unregulated space for the Treaty articles to matter as such. The sense that most
fields are regulated may be misleading, for it takes a static view of the fields to
which the internal market applies. By contrast, not only do new technologies,
products, and services develop, but the types, purposes, and forms of
socio-economic regulation also progress. It is precisely the legal power of the Treaty
articles that they are able to flow into each new regulatory space, since, being
defined in terms of the achievement of goals, their material scope of application is
unbounded. Their history has thus been one of consistent colonization of new areas
of law, from criminal law to social security to health care to civil procedure, and as
long as there are unharmonized areas of national law, there is likely to be legally
significant work for the Treaty articles to do.9 A study of the scope of the Treaty
articles is a study of the potential of the internal market and of its future direction.
3. Party Autonomy and the Vertical Effect of Free Movement Law
Where free movement law is examined, the focus is usually on a single economic
actor who wishes to enter a given market. However, entering a market entails
concluding contracts with parties in that market. Any measure that restricts
economic movement necessarily also restricts the formation of contracts. By
reducing the possibilities available to contracting parties, the measure could be said
to restrict freedom of contract. Free movement law could be described as a
prohibition on restrictions on contracts with an interstate element.10
How Law Restricts Judgments. The Influence of the European Court of Justice on the Legislative
Process of the European Community, University of Groningen, Groningen 2007.
8 Ibid.
9 ECJ 24 Nov. 1998, Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637; ECJ 28 Apr. 1998,
C-158/96 Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; ECJ 16 Dec. 1976, Case 33/76
Rewe-Zentralfinanz et al. v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989.
10 GRUNDMANN, n. 2 above, p. 270; cf. J. RUTGERS, ‘The European Economic Constitution,
Freedom of Movement, and the DCFR’, 5. European Review of Contract Law 2009, p. 95.
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However, this is not the same as saying that free movement law embodies a
principle of freedom of contract as such. There are two provisos to be addressed
before that can be claimed. First, there is the question of what is to be seen as a
‘restriction’. In the context of free movement law, the Court has interpreted this
widely.11 Measures that restrict freedom of contract in a conventional sense are
certainly caught, such as those that restrict the right of certain persons to enter into
contracts – rules that only registered lawyers may offer legal advice, for example –
or those that dictate the content of certain contracts – such as product standards –
but so are measures that work in a more indirect way.12 A measure that prevents
advertising could be a restriction on free movement in some circumstances, and a
measure that prevented itinerant traders from renting market stalls certainly would
be.13 These measures may hinder the formation of contracts between traders and
potential customers, but they do not work directly on the contract itself and might
not always be seen by private lawyers as restrictions on freedom of contract.
However, a ‘restriction’ can be defined in various ways both in the context of
free movement and of freedom of contract. Is movement to be seen as restricted by a
measure that merely adds to costs or imposes a regulatory burden but does not
prevent the movement entirely – raising the price of train tickets or limiting opening
hours or requiring licenses for websites, for example? A choice for a negative or
positive answer is better characterized as a policy choice than as the inevitable
outcome of deductive reasoning. Translating the question into contractual language,
is a measure that makes it less likely or more difficult that two parties will meet and
contract to be seen as a restriction on party autonomy? It does not forbid any
choice, nor impose any form of contract, yet its outcome is that certain contractual
choices or preferences are burdened, made harder, in a sense punished. Once
again, such a measure could be reasonably characterized as a restriction on party
autonomy or not. What can be seen is that debates about the notion of a restriction
on freedom will have essentially the same form within discussion of freedom of
movement and freedom of contract, with the importance of effect and consequences
being pitted against the importance of directness and immediacy.
11 ECJ 11 Jul. 1974, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; ECJ 30 Nov. 1995, Case C-55/94 Gebhard
v. Consiglio dell’ordine degli avvocati e procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165; ECJ 15 Dec.
1995, Case C-415/93 Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Association (URBSFA) v. Bosman
[1995] ECR I-4921; E. SPAVENTA, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter. Towards a (non) Economic
European Constitution’, 41. CMLRev 2004, p. 743; generally, C. BARNARD, Substantive Law of
the EU, 3rd edn, OUP, Oxford 2010.
12 For example, Gebhard; ECJ 20 Feb. 1979, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649.
13 Gebhard; ECJ 3 Oct. 2000, Case C-58/98 Corsten [2000] ECR I-7919; ECJ 24 Nov. 1993, Joined
Cases C-267 & C-268/91 Keck & Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097; ECJ 8 Mar. 2001, Case C-405/98
Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795; ECJ 13 Jan. 2000, Case C-254/98
Schutzverband v. TK-Heimdienst [2000] ECR I-151.
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The following can then be said: Whenever a measure is found to comprise a
restriction on movement in the sense that the Court uses this term, it can also be
said to comprise a restriction on freedom of contract, in precisely the same sense.
This can be turned around: Whenever a measure restricts the freedom of parties to
form interstate contracts, it will also amount to a restriction on free movement,
using restriction in the same sense in both cases. Free movement law, at least as
applied to states, is but a prohibition on restrictions on interstate contract
formation.
However, this is still not the same as saying that free movement law aims to
guarantee freedom of contract or is even consistent with freedom of contract as a
general principle. Free movement law is highly selective in the contractual
restrictions with which it is concerned. The Treaty articles on free movement only
apply to contracts with an interstate element: Either cross-border contracts or
domestic contracts to which one party is foreign.14 The suspicion may be raised that
these do not embody a liberal contractual freedom philosophy but rather seek to
replace one normative contractual imposition – the state preference for domestic
contract formation – with another one – an EU preference for interstate contract
formation.
There is certainly some evidence that free movement law over-promotes
interstate contracts in practice. One of the criticisms of mutual recognition and the
country of origin principle upon which it relies is that it places foreign market
entrants at an advantage by granting them exemption from burdensome regulations
to which domestic competitors continue to be subjected.15 This effect can certainly
be opportunistically overstated by disgruntled domestic incumbents who resent the
opening of their market, but it remains true that the application of free movement
law does not necessarily lead to market equality.
However, this effect needs to be seen in a broader context to be fully
understood. First, free movement law only intervenes where a national measure is
restricting market access for foreign economic actors.16 Such an effect inevitably – a
few extreme and atypical situations apart – benefits (other) market incumbents who
14 ECJ 1 Apr. 2008, Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community & Walloon Government v.
Flemish Government (Flemish Insurance Case) [2008] ECR I-1683; 133/85 to 136/85 Rau v.
Bundesanstalt für Landswirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1987] ECR 2289; ECJ 28 Mar. 1979, Case
175/78 Saunders [1979] ECR 1129; ECJ 9 Sep. 1999, Case C-108/98 RI-SAN [1999] ECR I-5219; A.
TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den
Rijn 2009; D. HANF, ‘Reverse Discrimination in EU Law: Constitutional Aberration,
Constitutional Necessity, or Judicial Choice?’, 18. Maastricht Journal 2011, p. 29.
15 TRYFONIDOU, pp. 173–215: G. DAVIES, ‘Services, Citizenship and the Country of Origin
Principle’, University of Edinburgh Mitchell Working Paper 2/2007, 2007.
16 See n. 14 above.
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are protected from competition.17 A measure that reduces market access therefore
always has a protectionist effect.18 The trigger for the application of the Treaty
articles is the existence of this inequality or market distortion. Such inequalities can
be seen as restrictions on party autonomy because they make it harder for a party
to contract with an out-of-state party and therefore restrict their freedom of choice.
The problem is that the Treaty articles are blunt instruments.19 Worded as
prohibitions, they only allow courts to set aside national measures but not to write
alternatives. This is what creates the risk of overshooting from discrimination
against the foreign into discrimination in favour of it. Yet if this happens to an
extent that is problematic, there is always the option of harmonization, an option
that is, of course, often used. The prohibitions in the Treaty articles may not always
be enough to create a reasonable level playing field on their own, but they are only
part of a market-making process, and that process as a whole is defined in the
Treaty and in the Court’s case law on harmonization to include the achievement of
market equality for all competitors: undistorted competition.20 It is therefore
unconvincing to conclude that free movement law is part of a policy of favouring
interstate contracts over domestic ones.
Thus while free movement pursues equality, it does not have the power to
always achieve it. This can be explained in terms of its relationship with two aspects
of freedom of contract: the freedom of a party to choose with whom they contract
and the freedom of the parties to choose the terms of their contract. Free movement
law is a law of limited application and it applies quite differently to each of these.
While the law aims to provide parties within the internal market with the freedom to
choose any other contractual partner within the internal market, it has much less
concern with what their contract may contain. This it leaves largely to the Member
States, only intervening where a rule on contractual terms has the effect of keeping
two contracting parties from each other. Even then, the role of the Treaty articles is
usually confined to determining which state’s rules are to govern the terms of the
contract in question – applying the country of origin principle. Free movement law
is about freedom to choose from what is on offer in the internal market but not
about what is offered as such. It is therefore not sufficient on its own to achieve
freedom of contract, in the sense of contractual choices free of state-imposed
distortions, but the work that it does can nevertheless most plausibly be seen in
terms of steps towards that goal.
17 J. SNELL, ‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?’, 47. CMLRev 2010, p. 437; G.
DAVIES, ‘Understanding Market Access’, 11. German Law Journal 2010, p. 671.
18 Ibid.
19 See HANF, n. 14 above.
20 ECJ 5 Oct. 2000, Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament & Council (Tobacco Advertising I) [2000]
ECR I-8419; Arts 113, 114, and 116 TFEU; Protocol 27 to the TFEU.
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4. Party Autonomy and the Horizontal Effect of Free Movement Law
The use of free movement law in horizontal situations has always been presented by
the Court as a logical extension of, and complement to, vertical effect, as if it
completes the work that the latter begins.21 Yet a few cases, including the important
and recent Viking Line, have applied free movement law in a way that suggests it
could develop into a significant constraint on private persons’ freedom of contract,
forbidding private discrimination against foreign parties. That would be a
surprising result, oddly in tension with the party autonomy-imbued spirit of its
application against states. However, a close look at the cases suggests that horizontal
effect is a more limited doctrine than a first glance may suggest.
The central case is now Viking Line.22 In this case, the Court said that:
57….. the Court would point out that it is clear from its case-law that the
abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for
persons and freedom to provide services would be compromised if the abolition of
State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise, by
associations or organisations not governed by public law, of their legal autonomy.
…..
64. It must be added that, contrary to the claims, in particular, of
ITF, it does not follow from the case-law of the Court referred to in para-
graph 57 of the present judgment that that interpretation applies only to
quasi-public organisations or to associations exercising a regulatory task and
having quasi-legislative powers.
The first part of this is entirely orthodox and emphasizes that the fundamental
reason for horizontal effect is to prevent avoidance by outsourcing and to promote
the effectiveness of the law: Since the law aims to remove restrictions on movement,
and it cannot be excluded that private organizations or persons might create such
restrictions, they must be subject to the law.
However, in older cases, this situation had primarily arisen where the private
body was exercising a quasi-regulatory or quasi-public function, and the application
of free movement law to this was easily understood in the light of the logic above.23
21 Viking Line, n. 1 above; ECJ 12 Dec. 1974, Case 36/74 Walrave & Koch v. Association Union
Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405; ECJ 6 Jun. 2000, Case C-281/98 Angonese v. Cassa di
Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] ECR I-4139; Bosman, n. 11 above; ECJ 12 Jun. 2003, Case C-112/00
Schmidberger v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659.
22 See n. 1. See also ECJ 18 Dec. 2007, Case C-341/05 Laval v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet
[2007] ECR I-11767.
23 Walrave, n. 21 above; Bosman, n. 11 above; 13 Dec. 1983, Case 222/82 Apple & Pear Development
Council [1983] ECR 4083; ECJ 18 May 1989, Joined Cases 266 and 267/87 Royal Pharmaceutical
Society [1989] ECR 1295; ECJ 13 Apr. 2000, Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada
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The novelty of Viking Line lies in paragraph 64, where the Court makes clear for
the first time that horizontal effect is not confined to such situations. This raises the
possibility that free movement law might apply to any private action that could be
understood as hindering the market access of a foreign economic actor and that this
concept might include, for example, a decision to buy domestic goods or to contract
with local partners, so that free movement would come to be a significant and direct
constraint on freedom of contract.24 At one extreme, the supermarket that decides
to stock only national goods as part of a marketing campaign or the corporation that
refuses to contract with foreign suppliers because of the prejudices of its owner
might be caught, while at the other the law would have to decide how to deal with
the individual who prefers only to sell local or national products from his market
stall, or only to buy local and national products for his house, or who would rather
not employ a foreign builder for his house or go to a doctor with a diploma from
another state.
There is no convincing reason to conclude from Viking Line that any of these
situations would fall within free movement law or to think that the Court will go
down the path towards their inclusion. While it does now appear to be the case that
any private action restricting free movement will be caught by the Treaty, that does
not answer the question of whether a discriminatory private contractual preference
is to be seen a restriction.25 The case law on horizontal effect – as discussed below –
has overwhelmingly concerned a different situation, that in which a private body
limits the capacity of two other parties to contract. This third-party intervention in
the contractual preferences of others is a different type of action from the exercise
of one’s own preferences in a contract to which one is a party, and extrapolation
from one situation to the other is quite a large step.
There are arguments for and against such extrapolation. It is certainly true
that refusals to buy or supply that are based on discriminatory preferences can
have a market exclusionary effect. They could be considered to restrict access to the
market. Yet the mechanism by which they exclude is fundamentally different from
intervention in the contracts of others, and it is also possible to read the Treaty
articles as providing a right of access to the consumers and suppliers of other states
but not a right that these consumers and suppliers choose to do business with you.
Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v. Fédération Royale Belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB)
[2000] ECR I-2681; ECJ 18 Jul. 2006, Case C-519/04 P Meca Medina and Majcen v. Commission
[2006] ECR I-6991. Cf. Angonese, n. 21 above; ECJ 13 Dec. 1984, Case 251/83 Haug-Adrion [1984]
ECR I-4277; ECJ 3 Oct. 2000, Case C-411/98 Ferlini v. Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg [2000]
ECR I-8081. See generally J. BAQUERO CRUZ, ‘Free Movement and Private Autonomy’, 24.
European Law Review 1999, p. 603.
24 See KRZEMINSKA-VAMVAKA.
25 See A. HARTKAMP, ‘The Effect of the EC Treaty in Private Law: On Direct and Indirect
Horizontal Effects of Primary Community Law’, 18. European Review of Private Law 2010, p.
527.
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Market access is a policy of market opportunity, not a guarantee of market success.
It prevents regulatory hostility but does not provide a right to a warm welcome by
other market denizens. There are good policy reasons for maintaining this
distinction. Not only would policing a ban on discriminatory contract preferences
be extremely difficult, but there would be challenging lines to be drawn between
legitimate and illegitimate choices. Why is choosing French wine for dinner
acceptable when a preference for a domestic service provider is not?
It is perhaps not surprising that the Court has, in the past, expressed
principled hostility to the idea that a private contractual choice is a restriction on
movement. Süllhofer and Sapod Audic are two cases in which a party to a contract
complained that one of the terms of that contract restricted their own capacity to
engage in interstate trade.26 Market circumstances were such that they were unable
to negotiate the removal of the clause, and so they challenged its entry in the
contract as, among other things, a violation of the free movement of goods. In
Süllhofer, the Court dismissed the argument for the rather unsatisfying reason that
the complaint belonged within competition law. In Sapod Audic, the primary
complaint was that national law had required the offensive clause to be inserted,
but the Court rejected this. It concluded in the light of this that
‘[the] … obligation arises out of a private contract between the parties to the main
proceedings. Such a contractual provision cannot be regarded as a barrier to trade
for the purposes of Article [34] of the Treaty since it was not imposed by a Member
State but agreed between individuals’.27 This seems to be a clear statement that
voluntarily made contractual terms will not be restrictions on trade.
Yet a challenge to this, and support for the view that contractual freedom
may be regulated by the Treaty, is apparently provided by two other cases:
Haug-Adrion and Ferlini.28 In both of these cases, the Court addressed the
compatibility with free movement of terms in a private contract. In the first case,
concerning a motor insurance contract that disadvantaged those exporting their
cars, they found the terms actuarially justified and therefore permissible, but the
fact that justification was considered implies that there was no reason of principle
why a contractual term should not fall within free movement law. In Ferlini, a term
in a health services contract that indirectly disadvantaged foreign residents was
actually found to violate the Treaty ban on nationality discrimination.
Ferlini is most easily explicable by the fact that the discriminatory fees in
question were charged by a consortium of health-care providers that amounted to
pretty much the entirety of the Luxembourg hospital system. Thus, while it may
26 ECJ 27 Sep. 1988, Case 65/86 Süllhofer [1988] ECR 5249; ECJ 6 Jun. 2002, Case C-159/00 Sapod
Audic [2002] ECR I-5021.
27 Paragraph 74.
28 ECJ 13 Dec. 1984, Case 251/83 Haug-Adrion [1984] ECR I-4277; ECJ 3 Oct. 2000, Case C-411/98
Ferlini v. Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg [2000] ECR I-8081.
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formally have been a private consortium – albeit including at least one public
hospital – it had essentially a public function and public status. It is quite common
for national health-care systems to include both formally public and formally
private organizations, but in the case law on free movement of patients the Court
does not appear to consider the distinction between those relevant to the application
of the law, where they were part of a national system.29 This fits with the approach
in other areas, where those exercising public power or privileges are bound by the
Treaty whatever their formal status under national law.30 Ferlini really falls within
the case law on quasi-public organizations, or private regulators, and the
well-established principle that those actually able to regulate or control an area of
economic activity are subject to the Treaty.31 The Court cited its case law to this
effect when it said in the case that ‘According to the case-law of the Court, the first
paragraph of Article [18] of the Treaty also applies in cases where a group or
organization such as the EHL exercises a certain power over individuals and is in a
position to impose on them conditions which adversely affect the exercise of the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Treaty’.32 The question that Ferlini
raises is ‘how much power?’ At what point does a body become so dominant over its
contractual party that it attracts the attention of the Treaty? Must it have power
over a whole sector, as in the cases, including Ferlini, was the case? Or could
bargaining power over the specific contractual partner be enough? The statement in
Ferlini is broad, but it is not an example of this latter situation, and in Sapod
Audic, which is such an example, the Court took a different approach. The
conclusion must be that it is probably necessary to have at least some form of
market power to attract the Treaty, and a mere unequal bargaining position does
not make a contract term a violation of free movement law.33
Yet there is Haug-Adrion. The case does not reveal that the insurance
company in question had market power or that its disadvantageous terms were
offered by all other insurance companies – although two well-informed
commentators have suggested that there was a market-wide approach and the
contractual terms were collectively adopted.34 Switching insurance companies
always brings costs and problems, so it may well have been that there was inequality
between the contractual parties, a ‘certain power’ in the terms of Ferlini, but this
was power specific to their relationship. If that is enough to attract the Treaty, then
(the much more recent) Sapod Audic is wrong and the horizontal reach of free
29 ECJ 12 May 2003, Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509.
30 ECJ 12 Jul. 1990, Case C-188/89 Foster v. British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313.
31 See n. 23 above.
32 Paragraph 50.
33 Cf. the ‘reasonableness’ criterion suggested by Advocate General Maduro in Viking Line, para. 48
of the Opinion.
34 P. OLIVER & W.-H. ROTH, ‘The Internal Market and the Four Freedoms’, 41. CMLRev 2004, p.
407 at 422.
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movement is far indeed, since many commercial contracts will involve a larger,
dominant, and a smaller, supplicant, party – supermarket purchasing, supply to
large companies, and so on.
There are three reasons to hesitate before reading Haug-Adrion in this way.
First, the case is more than 20 years old and has not been followed. There has been
no development of the idea that private contractual terms can be restrictions on free
movement of one of the parties, and the cases above, suggesting the opposite, are
more recent. Second, the Court found that there was no restriction because the
terms were objectively justified. Logically, justification is only relevant if a measure
would otherwise be a restriction. However, where a measure is manifestly
reasonable, there will be a clear temptation for the Court to dispose of it quickly on
this basis and gloss over the prior doctrinal issue of whether it should fall within the
Treaty at all. The result is the same, and the principled difference between the
approaches may be of more interest to academics than to judges – which is not to
say it has no consequences, but that these consequences are beyond the case itself.
Most importantly, third, it is profoundly unclear what the Court was trying to say
or decide upon and whether it even intended to rule upon the contract as such. It is
quite arguable that Haug-Adrion was intended to be a conventional judgment about
public measures and no more.
This follows from the facts. Insurance terms of the type in question were
regulated by law, and the advocate general’s opinion focused exclusively on the
question of whether these laws violated the Treaty, which appears to have been what
the parties were arguing. The issue was that they permitted but did not require the
term in question. When the granting of permission, without an obligation, is
sufficient to comprise, a state violation was also relevant to Sapod Audic and can be
of some complexity; one might think, as the Court found in Sapod Audic, that the
discriminatory act, if merely permitted, is to be attributed to private parties alone.
On the other hand, it is possible to imagine constructions in which permission
amounts to tacit support, encouragement, or even public pressure to take a certain
approach. The distinctions between requiring, not prohibiting, and permitting may
well need precise analysis in some situations, although beyond the scope of this
article. However, until the Court’s judgment in Haug-Adrion, there was no
suggestion that the contractual terms as such might violate the Treaty. In that
judgment, it is quite unclear whether it is the legality of the terms, the national
measure, or the terms as expressions of that measure is in issue. A quote, though
lengthy, makes this clear and is worthwhile given the uniqueness of the case:
20. It must be observed in that respect that the Court has consistently held that
Article [35 TFEU] applies only to national measures which have as their specific
object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby the
establishment of a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of a
Member State and its export trade, in such a way as to provide a special
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advantage for national products or for the domestic market of the state
concerned.
21. National rules such as those in question in the main proceedings do
not fall within that category; they merely authorize insurance companies to
take into account in their tariff conditions particular circumstances in which
vehicles are used which increase or diminish the insurance risk, such as, for
example, the use of vehicles registered under customs plates.
22. Quite apart from the fact that the enactment of such rules in a
Member State in no way prohibits insurers in that state from granting a
bonus in respect of vehicles registered under customs plates, there is nothing
to suggest that a tariff condition such as that at issue in the main proceedings,
covered by such rules, gives any advantage whatever to national products or
to the domestic market of the Member State concerned.
23. The answer to the question put by the national court must
therefore be that the refusal of a no-claims bonus to insured persons resident
in another Member State who own a vehicle registered under customs plates is
not contrary to any provision of Community law, in so far as that refusal is
based solely on objective actuarial criteria applied in a non-discriminatory
manner.
The first paragraph quoted is apparently clear: The Court is considering the legality
of the national rules, as had the advocate general had in his opinion, and in
accordance with the case brought by the parties. Yet the text becomes ever more
ambiguous until the last paragraph appears to be concluding that the terms
themselves are not restrictions, because it is justified as if the case was about the
contract, and it is this possibility that caused the case to attract attention for its
possible horizontal impact. On balance, it is suggested that this conclusion is more
an example of sloppy wording than a sudden decision to draw a horizontal
conclusion out of a hat. What the Court probably intended to say is that the
national rules do not unlawfully restrict movement for two reasons: One, they do
not require the clause, and two, the clause is quite reasonable anyway – even if it
were required that would be permitted. The judgment does not therefore provide
support for contractual terms as restrictions on movement. It is a conventional case
about public measures.
Two other cases are of peripheral relevance: Dansk Supermarked and
Vlaamse Reisbureaus.35 In both of these cases, the Court made powerful statements
that are somewhat less impactful when put in their factual context. In the first case,
it found that ‘it is impossible in any circumstances for agreements between
35 ECJ 22 Jan. 1981, Case 58/80 Dansk Supermarked [1981] ECR 181; ECJ 1 Oct. 1987, Case 311/85
Vlaamse Reisbureaus [1987] ECR 3801.
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individuals to derogate from the mandatory provisions of the Treaty on the free
movement of goods’,36 an apparently broad finding that nevertheless begs the
question of what such a derogation would be. In that case, two parties were
attempting to rely on a contract between themselves to argue for a restraint on the
trade possibilities of a third. Thus, while a contract may have been in issue, it was
not the freedom of a party that was in issue but of another person. This is an
example of a contract being used to interfere with the contractual freedom – the
possibility to contract with customers – of a third party and thus fits within the
thesis of this article that it is third-party interference that offends the law. In
Vlaamse Reisbureas, the Court ruled unequivocally that the rules on free movement
of goods do not apply to undertakings because these are governed by competition
law. The absoluteness of this may be doubted given that Viking apparently
contradicts it and that there is no logical or policy reason why the free movement of
goods should be different from the other freedoms. In any case, as the Court went
on to note, the facts concerned services rather than goods. The fact that it did not
even consider whether there might be a restriction on services but confined itself to
irrelevant statements about goods rather undermines the credibility of the judgment
as a whole. While Vlaamse Reisbureaus supports the idea that the horizontal effect
of free movement is limited, it is not a case that deserves great weight.
These few cases where contractual provisions and free movement have
interacted are not examples of the Court at its most lucid. The mere fact that there
are so few of them may be one of the most powerful arguments that free movement is
not understood by the Court, or courts, to regulate private contractual preferences
as such, outside of a private regulatory context. The judgments express this view
with greater or lesser degrees of clarity, Sapod Audic being the clearest and
Haug-Adrion only managing, ultimately, to throw up one, small, rather faint,
question mark.
Yet before it can finally concluded that the exercise of private contractual
preferences does not amount to a restriction on free movement, two areas of law
that apparently suggest the contrary must be addressed: public procurement and
the free movement of workers. These are the only two areas in which the Court
actually has found that the exercise of a contractual preference by a contracting
party could offend the free movement rules. In the case of workers, it is quite
explicit that Article 45 TFEU prevents discrimination against foreign workers in all
aspects of employment,37 while in the case of procurement such discrimination is
prohibited in government purchasing, not just by the relevant directives, but by the
36 Paragraph 17.
37 Angonese, n. 21 above; ECJ 17 Jul. 2008, Case C-94/07 Raccanelli v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur
Förderung der Wissenschaften [2008] ECR I-5939.
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Treaty articles on free movement as applied by the Court. Discriminatory
government purchasing preferences are restrictions on movement.38
Each of these has its own legal nuances. The Treaty article on free movement
of workers is atypically worded and contains – unlike the other free movement
articles – a ban on discrimination, which makes extension of the article to
contracting parties much more defensible.39 It is this discrimination rule that has
been relevant to both cases in which Article 45 has been applied horizontally rather
than the preceding sentence of the article, which, like the other Treaty articles,
refers to free movement.40 It is easy to make a textual case that employment
judgments do not set a precedent for free movement in general. Similarly,
procurement concerns states, and these are subject to the duty of loyalty in Article 4
TEU. Discrimination in purchasing may arguably be seen as a violation of this, in
combination with the principles of free movement.41 The state as contracting
partner, like the employer as contracting partner, is subject to wider Treaty
obligations than is the case for other actors within the internal market. It may be
noted that in Dundalk, and to a lesser extent in Parking Brixen, the Court
emphasized the public nature of the purchaser in reasoning towards the conclusion
that its preferences violated the free movement of goods – the suggestion being that
the position of a private purchaser, even a large one, would be different.
Yet another explanation – not contradicting the one above but
complementing it – of why it is these two areas, and only these two areas, in which
free movement restrains contractual preferences, is that there is a broad social and
legal consensus that employers and governments have a reduced, or non-existent,
right to freedom of contract. Their rights and obligations are different from those of
other buyers and sellers.42 Precisely, the fact that the law reaches the furthest into
these two areas suggests that free movement law is in fact following the outlines of
freedom of contract as understood in the laws and traditions of the Member States.
In the case of governments, this is obvious. Neither the moral arguments for
freedom of contract nor the economic ones provide a basis for governmental
contractual freedom that is equivalent to that for private persons. Contractual
38 ECJ 22 Sep. 1988, Case 45/87 Commission v. Ireland (Dundalk Council) [1988] ECR 4929; ECJ 20
Mar. 1990, Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours [1990] ECR I-889; ECJ 13 Oct. 2005, Case C-458/03
Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I-8585.
39 Article 45(2) TFEU.
40 Article 45(1) TFEU.
41 See ECJ 9 Dec. 1997, Case C-265/95 Commission v. France (‘Spanish Strawberries’) [1997] ECR
I-6959.
42 KRZEMINSKA-VAMVAKA, n. 1 above, 144; See also M. KUMM, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Total
Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law’,
7(4). German Law Journal 2006, p. 342; M. DE MOL, ‘The Novel Approach of the CJEU on the
Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Principle of Non-discrimination’, 18. Maastricht Journal 2011,
p. 109 at 112.
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liberty is not a part of the autonomy that they need to be happy, as it may be for
individuals, and it is not essential to the process of societal welfare maximization,
which economics suggests that it may be where individual preferences are
concerned. Nor is governmental contractual liberty a necessary counterbalance to
the risks of regulatory tyranny, a reasonable part of a policy of checks and
balances.
The only argument for governmental contractual liberty might be a
subsidiarity-based one, which would see devolved levels of government as agents of
small communities and the contractual actions of these devolved levels as essentially
reflections of these communities’ choices.43 This would draw on both welfare
economics and democratic principles to suggest that local communities should be
able to express their own preferences in their collective contracting, even if these
deviate from those around them. However, while this argument may have merits, it
is not reflected in conventional views about freedom of contract, which see this as an
essentially private right.44 In apparently not awarding this right to states, the EU is
following legal consensus on freedom of contract, not challenging it.
Employers often are private parties and, by contrast, conventionally would
be seen as enjoying a right to contractual freedom. However, it is now the
near-universal practice of national legislators, and of the EU legislator, to constrain
this right dramatically.45 Employment is typically subject not only to various
non-discrimination norms, but also the content of employment contracts is greatly
determined by parties other than the employer or employee, notably the state, trade
unions, and other employers as represented in social bargaining processes. The idea
that the employer should be able to contract according to their preferences and
prejudices has long been narrowed down to the point where freedom of contract,
other than the freedom to take the objectively most suited candidate, is the
exception more than the rule. To subject employers, therefore, to a
non-discrimination principle derived from free movement law is to limit freedom of
contract in a way that is highly conventional and once again following national
practices rather than challenging them. There may be arguments about precisely
which constraints employers should be subject to, but these are mere details of
political debate. Any principle that employers should be able to employ whoever
they want, on whatever terms they want, has long been abandoned in Europe and
much of the rest of the world.
43 See, e.g., KERBER & VAN DEN BERGH, p. 447.
44 See n. 42 above.
45 For example, Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in
employment and occupation [2000] OJ 303/16; Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22;
Directive 2004/113 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the
access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L 373/37.
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It is therefore reasonable to conclude that free movement law only applies to
contractual decisions where the party in question is conventionally regarded as
having no, or severely diminished, rights to contractual freedom. There are no
examples in the case law of the subjection of ‘mere’ private parties to contractual
constraints and little basis in the reasoning of the judgments to think that such
subjection will occur. The Court appears to be fitting free movement snugly into a
freedom-of-contract jacket.
One question that this leaves is how we may expect the law to develop in the
future. What kinds of other contractual constraints, outside of employment or
procurement, might be compatible with freedom of contract? What other kinds of
parties are conventionally not considered to enjoy this right to the full? Two
additional categories of private actors are obvious candidates for a possible
application of free movement law: those with market power and those who offer
their goods or services publicly on an open market.
To be rejected by one customer or supplier is a shame but is not usually
synonymous with a reduction of access to the market.46 Each customer or supplier is
but one among many. However, if that customer or supplier has market power, then
it may well be that they comprise so much of the market – or a crucial part of it –
that losing the chance to contract with them makes entering that market difficult.
This is part of the logic of subjecting government purchasing to legal constraints,
the purchasing power of the state being uniquely large.47 It can also be used to
understand the horizontal effect of free movement of workers: The employment
market is far less flexible than others, and rejection by an employer will usually
impact more on an individual’s capacity to enter an employment market than will
rejection by a customer in another field. An employer can often be seen as in a
dominant position relative to candidates for a job. The law could consistently reject
application of the Treaty articles to contracts by most private parties but make an
exception for dominant market players, precisely on the grounds that contracts with
these players are, unlike with other parties, almost essential for market access. This
would amount to an extension of the ‘private regulation’ line of case law to
situations of dominance, with Ferlini providing some limited support.48
However, private persons with market power are subject to competition law,
and the question is whether free movement law has anything to add.49 It is certainly
arguable that direct and indirect nationality discrimination – which would
encompass matters such as price discrimination and refusal to supply but perhaps
also unjustified rejection of foreign standards and specifications – will fall within
46 Advocate General Maduro’s Opinion, Viking Line, n. 1 above, para. 42.
47 C. BOVIS, ‘The Regulation of Public Procurement as a key element of European Economic Law’,
4. European Law Journal 1998, p. 220 at 226–227.
48 See text subsequent to n. 28 above.
49 See Case 178/82 Van de Haar [1984] ECR 1797.
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abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU.50 If the criterion for engaging free
movement was weaker than market power in an Article 102 sense, but extended to
mere inequality of bargaining power, then free movement would certainly add
value, but this extension would raise policing issues again. Inequality of bargaining
power is ubiquitous – indeed, equality of bargaining power must be exceptional.
The law usually intervenes only when the inequality is unconscionable, and one may
well ask why that should be the case short of market dominance (issues of mental
competence and so aside).
The relevance of competition law therefore suggests good reasons for free
movement to steer clear, since bringing such behaviour within the free movement
articles will add to confusion about the functions of different areas of law, while not
obviously adding to the substantive constraints on the market actors.51 On the other
hand, one can argue that the normative battle for freedom of contract is already lost
– due to competition law dominant actors cannot choose their contractual partners
freely – so there is no reason not to let free movement wade into the fray and defend
its own goals.52 In fact, it may well have something substantial to add since the
approach to issue of evidence and justification is far simpler in free movement than
in competition law. Where a bank or telecoms company refuses to contract or
imposes onerous terms on the grounds of nationality or place of residence, it may be
easier to rely on the free movement of capital or services, and the (sometimes
alarmingly) common-sense case law on restrictions and justifications, than it would
be to rely on competition law with its love of intricate economic theorizing and
expensive market surveys, even if in principle the competition rules would help.
Yet there is probably a better – more clearly principled and more practical –
approach than a focus on market power, with its difficult questions of degree. That
is to distinguish between privately made contracts and goods and services offered
publicly on an open market. Common situations such as the bank that refuses
mortgages on foreign properties, or to foreign customers, or the telecoms company
that subjects foreign customers to all kinds of hurdles before connecting them could
be addressed via this route. It has the practical advantage that not many companies
have market power in the competition law sense, and for the consumer problems
often occur where companies adopt parallel policies: for example, all the banks
apparently share the same suspicion of foreign properties, entirely independently of
each other. It is almost impossible for the ordinary consumer to prove collusion and
rely on Article 101 TFEU in such circumstances, and it may indeed not even exist.
50 See A. JONES & B. SUFRIN, EC Competition Law, 3rd edn, OUP, Oxford 2010, pp. 321–322.
51 G. MARENCO, ‘Competition between National Economies and Competition between Businesses: A
Response to Judge Pescatore’, 10. Fordham International Law Journal 1987, p. 420.
52 See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Viking Line, n. 1 above. P. PESCATORE, ‘Public and
Private Aspects of European Community Law’, 10. Fordham International Law Journal 1987,
p. 373 at 378–379; BAQUERO CRUZ, p. 603.
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An approach that said that those offering their goods and services publicly on the
open market must respect the non-discrimination norm – market access clearly
being of little use in this context, since no individual bank could be said to be
hindering market access – would certainly be of practical use to many individuals
and further the goal of interstate transactions and would therefore be attractive to
the Court. Its impact on the freedom of contract of the offering party could be
justified by reference to common practice. As with employers, it is common in
national law to subject the public marketplace to certain normative constraints.
National law will quite commonly have something to say about the shop that refuses
customers of a certain race, sex, age, or sexuality, and indeed, the EU has recently
adopted directives addressing discrimination on grounds of sex and race in the
supply of goods and services.53 As with employers, the ideological battle for a pure
freedom of contract is long finished, and all that is left is the details of the
settlement. Prohibiting private nationality discrimination in this context is a step of
limited conceptual importance.
Yet while the application of free movement law to such parties would be
defensible and imaginable, and not directly contrary to cases such as Sapod Audic
and Vlaamse Reisbureaus since these did not concern discrimination against
consumers, it must be remembered that it would still be a step beyond the case law
so far. There is no positive support in the cases for such an extension. The situation
is not one of third-party intervention as in Viking, a market access argument is not
self-evident, and yet absent such an argument it is not clear what might engage the
Treaty’s non-discrimination ban.
The cases so far therefore suggest that the Court is reluctant to impinge on
private freedom of contract rather than seeing free movement law as aiming to
protect that freedom. Employment is a special case, and it would be possible to
extend the law to the supply of goods and services to the public without shattering
its conceptual framework, but even this cannot be taken as a sure thing: In 50
years, there has not been a single case that clearly supports this step, and a few that
speak against it. The Court has shown no inclination to take the law anywhere that
conventional, even conservative, private law notions of contractual freedom suggest
that it should not be. Freedom of contract is leading free movement, not running
away from it.
Two final comments may be added. One concerns Mangold and
Kücükdeveci.54 These important cases, although not about free movement,
nevertheless suggest that the principle of non-discrimination applies horizontally
throughout the sphere of EU law. However, it is precisely the argument of this
article that the Court does not appear to find that private contractual preferences
53 Directive 2004/113, n. 45 above; Directive 2000/43, n. 45 above.
54 ECJ 22 Nov. 2005, Case C-144/04 Mangold v. Helm [2005] ECR I-9981; ECJ 19 Jan. 2010, Case
C-555/07 Kücükdeveci v. Swedex, not yet reported.
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generally fall within that sphere. Of course, it has room for manoeuvre, and an
extension of the Mangold approach remains possible.55 However, the cases above
suggest that there is no desire to extend free movement law in this way, and there is
plenty of logical and jurisprudential bases for a continuation of the current
abstinent approach.
The second comment concerns what is often claimed to be the divergence
between the law on free movement of goods and the other freedoms. The restrictive
approach of the Court in Vlaamse Reisbureaus or Sapod Audic is often contrasted
with Viking Line or Walrave to suggest that horizontal effect is a phenomenon only
occurring outside of goods. On the contrary, the analysis in this article suggests that
there is no conflict between the goods cases and the others: They concern
analytically different situations. In the former, parties to a contract attempt to
avoid it by claiming that terms of that contract violate free movement law. In the
latter, parties complain that a third party is preventing them contracting. There has
been no Viking Line concerning goods, and hence, no case where the Court has had
to address such third-party interference. Schmidberger might have been one, but it
was not the demonstrators who were sued – it was the state – so the issue did not
arise.56
5. Conclusion
Academic discussion of horizontal effect has often concentrated on the types of legal
persons to which the law may be applied. This article suggests that the character of
the person is rather less important than what that person is trying to do. As when
determining what is an undertaking, or what is a service, one should not look at the
nature of the institution but at the nature of its actions.57 In the case of horizontal
effect, the question is whether the actor concerned is seeking to restrain the party
autonomy of others, in which case free movement law will, in general, intervene, or
whether they are exercising their own private contractual preferences, in which case
in general free movement will abstain. Free movement has, until now, stuck closely
to a path of maximizing individual contractual autonomy.
That free movement has followed this path will not surprise those who
criticize it for its undermining effect on national social policies and its relentless
individualism.58 The surprising aspect of the law is however that goes no further
55 DE MOL, p. 109.
56 ECJ 12 Jun. 2003, C-112/00 Schmidberger v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659.
57 See JONES & SUFRIN, pp. 128–129; G. DAVIES, ‘The Process and Side-Effects of Harmonisation
of European Welfare States’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 2/06, 2006, pp. 15–17.
58 C. BARNARD, ‘Viking and Laval: An Introduction’, in C. Barnard (ed.), Cambridge Yearbook of
European Legal Studies, vol. 10, 2007–2008, Hart, Oxford 2008; A.C.L. DAVIES, ‘The Right to
Strike versus Freedom of Establishment in EC Law: The Battle Commences’, 35. Industrial Law
Journal 2006, p. 75; A. HINAREJOS, ‘Laval and Viking: The Right to Collective Action versus EU
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than this. By limiting free movement to a protection of party autonomy, the Court
has apparently excluded discriminatory contractual preferences from the law,
despite the fact that these are almost certainly widespread and that they will have a
significant effect on the dynamics of the internal market. Is this a rare example of
EU law surrendering effectiveness to personal autonomy and accepting
discriminatory preferences as a legitimate limit to integration?
An alternative view is that it is more efficient, and even more effective, to let
change come through the exercise of free choice than to try and impose it. It is
consistent with a certain faith in markets to believe that people will ultimately
explore the opportunities available to them and that liberty changes the person
liberated. Party autonomy may be a mechanism for mentality change, and so for
deep integration, where compulsion would merely provide a more fragile increase in
trade and at considerable practical cost given the difficulties of policing it. One does
not need to read the limited legal scope of free movement as an indicator of limited
ambition. Indeed, given that both the consistent pursuit of integration and the use
of second-order effects are ubiquitous features of EU law, it is more consistent to see
free movement as an exercise in integration through mentality change than as a
policy that accepts the limits set by current consumer and business preferences.59
This invites an explanation of its selective extension into contractual
preferences where governments and employers are involved. These parties, it might
be speculated, do not learn well enough or fast enough. In the first case, they may
not learn at all: There may be reasons why governments will prefer national
suppliers unless hounded not to, either derived from public choice theory or from
the under-representation of foreign suppliers in the national democratic system.60
In the second case, market idealism might lead us to think that employers will be led
to discard discrimination by a gradual awareness of its pointlessness and
inefficiency, just as we may expect other purchasers to do. However, the difference
is that employees are human beings who may be seriously harmed by discriminatory
rejections, and when issues of dignity and fundamental rights are involved, there
may be no time to wait for mentalities to involve.61 Employing people is different
from buying stuff, and the short-term/long-term cost-benefit trade-off is different.
Fundamental Freedoms’, 8. Human Rights Law Review 2008, p. 714; N. REICH, ‘Free Movement
v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – The Laval and Viking Cases before the ECJ’, 9(2). German
Law Journal 2008, p. 125; J. MALMBERG & T. SIGEMAN, ‘Industrial Actions and EU Economic
Freedoms: The Autonomous Collective Bargaining Model Curtailed by the European Court of
Justice’, 45. CMLRev 2008, p. 1115.
59 See S. DEAKIN, ‘Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?’, 12.
European Law Journal 2006, p. 440.
60 See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1962; M. POIARES
MADURO, We the Court, Hart, Oxford 1998.
61 See KUMM, n. 42 above; TRYFONIDOU, n. 14 above.
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This interpretation of the logic of the law suggests that free movement is less
classically liberal than the adherence to party autonomy might suggest. Personal
liberty is not portrayed above as a normative pillar of the internal market but
rather an instrument of integration, and indeed of self-realization. The consumer is
being both used and manipulated. A consequence is that respect for party autonomy
may be conditional: In the event that it seems not to be achieving the
transformations hoped, it may be augmented by compulsion without any
transgression of principle, either through secondary legislation or through new
developments in the case law. The proposition that individuals are likely to evolve
when exposed to market liberty is a contingent one rather than an embedded
ideological commitment and so open to empirical rebuttal and to setting aside.
Welfare economics, it may be noted, can make no sense of any of this.
Despite the inclination of both policymakers and some commentators to look at free
movement in terms of conventional economic ideas about market efficiency and
increasing welfare, the way it is actually applied is quite divorced from what
economics would prescribe. Were free movement to be aimed at welfare increase, in
the orthodox economic sense, it would be used to enable increased satisfaction of the
consumer’s subjective preferences, without either judging or questioning those
preferences.62 The preference manipulation that it in fact embodies is, by contrast,
a form of preference rejection and therefore at odds with the lessons of traditional
economics.63 Most notably, where national regulation corresponds to national
consumer preferences, for example, by providing a degree of certainty and
protection for which the consumer is prepared to pay (in the higher price of goods
and services) but which the market is unable to supply, welfare economics would
regard this as an efficient and desirable prevention of a possible externality.64 The
Court of course, as is well known, does not.65
Its interventions in national regulation are therefore probably welfare
reducing. It is implausible to think that it can judge the preferences of national
consumers better than the national legislator, and in watering down protective
legislation suiting local preferences it creates a market that is less able to provide
these consumers with what they want. This immediate and short-term loss must then
be justified by longer term goals. Economically, free movement will work, if it
works, by changing the preferences of Europeans so that they gradually become
62 Critically, but with discussion of the orthodoxy, D. SOBEL, ‘On the Subjectivity of Welfare’, 107.
Ethics 1997, p. 501; C. SUNSTEIN, ‘Willingness to Pay versus Welfare’, John M. Olin Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 326, 2007 (available on <http://ssrn.com>).
63 Ibid.
64 P.J. HAMMER, ‘Antitrust beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge
of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs’, 98. Michigan Law Review 2000, p. 849; M. GAL & I.
FAIBISH, ‘Six Principles for Limiting Government-Facilitated Restraints on Competition’, 44.
CMLRev 2007, p. 69.
65 ECJ 20 Feb. 1979, Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649.
826
people for whom a single market is welfare enhancing. There is a deferred welfare
gain. Politically, these amended preferences may serve the goal of integration and
the associated potential advantages for the stability of Europe and for the EU as an
organization and geopolitical actor. Free movement makes sense within this broader
picture but not within the narrower one of immediate economic efficiency.
This is somewhat in contrast to one of the common stereotypes of free
movement: that it embodies a slavish adherence to economic efficiency and is only
tempered by politics where the Court allows derogations or where the European
legislator harmonizes. Instead, this article suggests that free movement is a project
in transformative social engineering, essentially political, in which party autonomy
is employed to trigger social and political change. Immediate economic rationality
only enters via the space for derogations, where some degree of – limited –
compensation for externalities is permitted to temper the negative welfare
consequences of the European consumer’s largely unwanted liberty. Free movement
will only become welfare-increasing in the longer term, when European consumers
have learned to become good Europeans: when freedom of contract has become
something that they want.
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